Wednesday, July 10, 2019

The State of Working India and the Changing Nature of Work



Commentary on the reports published by CSE, Azim Premji University and World Bank


Sanjay Kumar


Public reports on important economic and social issues by research institutes, public policy institutes and the so-called ‘think-tanks’ are increasingly becoming significant contributors to public discourse. The form of such reports, using graphics, tables,and boxes on case studies and important points, is meant to bring out results of the ongoing specialised and academic research in the public domain for general discussion. Hence, such reports try to create a bridge between objective knowledge derived through focused research on the one hand, and public discourse on the other. The underlying assumption is laudable, because a judicious public policy mix can emerge only out of an informed public discussion and debate. However, as this commentary will try to show, under the veneer of research and academic claims such reports also contribute to biases of dominant ideologies, and hence require critical appraisal.

Two important reports related to work were published last year. The State of Working India 2018 (SWI) was brought out by Centre for Sustainable Employment of Azim Premji University. Its lead author is Amit Basole, head of the Centre. Besides available data and existing research, the report also draws upon a number of background papers written specifically for it by academics, journalists and activists. The other report is the 2019 World Development Report titled The Changing Nature of Work (WDR2019), published by World Bank, and written by its staff. Digital versions of both reports are freely available on the internet. SWI looks at the macro and long term trends in employment and conditions of work in India during the past two and a half decades. It is an objective assessment based upon a wide variety of data. It does not fight shy of controversies.While explaining issues under debate, and presenting arguments from both sides, it does not hesitate to state its own position unambiguously with argument and data. WDR2019 is about the ongoing restructuring of employment due to new technologies like robotics, artificial intelligence, etc. and possible responses from state institutions to these potentially disruptive changes. It is a mixed bag. The language is borrowed from capitalist managerial discourses, it misrepresents radical anti-capitalist arguments, and even some of the data and studies it relies upon are not dependable and thorough.

What is Happening to Working Indians: An Objective Appraisal
SWI starts with an executive summary of main observations and conclusions, that actually sets up the current context and orientation of the report. It is followed by six chapters including the Introduction and Conclusion. The four theme-based chapters are on the nature of the Indian workforce, employment trends in different sectors of the economy, quality of available employment from the perspective of workers’ welfare, and continuing caste and gender disparities and discriminations in Indian working environments.

Two facts stand out about the current employment scenario in the country. First is the jobless nature of growth under neoliberal policies sincethe early 1990s, and secondis the drop in the number of jobs since 2015. Regarding the first fact the Executive Summary notes that whereas in the 1970s and 80s 3-4 percent GDP growth led to around 2 percent employment growth, the 1990s, despite a much faster GDP growth of 7 percent on average,has led to a 1 percent growth in the number of jobs. The situation became worse after 2013. According to the Employment-Unemployment Surveys of the Labour Bureau (LB-EUS), the total volume of employment in the Indian economy shrank between 2013 and 2015. In the face of unflinching data from the LB-EUSthat the number of jobs in the country is decreasing, the Modi government did a creative intervention. It simply stopped the Labour Bureau survey after 2015. So, now there are no official estimates of the number of jobs in the economy.


The second chapter analyses trends in the Indian labourforce.The country had 926 million working age people (i.e. those above the age of 15 years) in 2015, and their number is increasing at the rate of 2.7 percent. Out of this, 50-52% constitute its labourforce, which is made up of people either in employment, or looking for one. This percentage is called the labour force participation ratio (LFPR). The ratio of people looking for work, to the total labour force gives the unemployment rate (UR).

After the Modi government stopped Labour Bureau surveys, the only estimate of LFPR and UR are from the non-governmentCenter for Monitoring Indian Economy (CMIE) surveys. The LFPR in 2017 showed a significant drop to 43.9%. Roughly 40 millions less Indians were employed in 2017 than in 2015.As against the serious loss of jobs brought out by the CMIE surveys,  Surjeet S Bhalla (who till recently was a member of the Prime Minister’s Economic Advisory Council) and Tirthamonoy Das claim creation of 13 million new jobs in 2017. SWI systematically debunks this claim in Box 2.1 by showing that Bhalla and Das actually assume (namely a high LFPR and a low UR) what needs to be proved. 

According to the BSE-CMIE data the unemployment rate stood at 5.7% in 2018. Such high rates are a relatively new phenomenon in India. It is widely known that India suffers from underemployment because the sprawling labour market of the unorganised sector always ‘clears’ the labour supply, including child labour. The new unemployment phenomenon relates to educated unemployed. Outof 55 million graduate and higher educated in the labour force, 9 million, i.e. one out of six, are unemployed. Another feature of the employment scenario in India is a very low 27 percentLFPR for women compared to other countries in a similar economic bracket. As SWI rightly notes, ‘while men are openly unemployed, women are not even part of the labour force.’

Thestructural change in the Indian economy is the focus of the third chapter titled ‘Where is the Work?’ It frames this question analyticallyby two processes, which it calls the Kuznets process and the Lewis process. The former refers to transition from an agriculture based subsistence economy to an industrial economy. The latter refers to transition from self-employment and family-based small enterprises to large formal enterprises run on hired labour. From the point of view of development economics both are desirable as they imply increase in productivity and the possibility of a legally imposed welfare regime.

Since independence the proportion of Indians engaged in agriculture has been declining, yet till the beginning of this century, their absolute number was increasing with population. Since then the Indian economy has entered a new phase of declining workforce in agriculture. During 2005-11, the employment in agriculture declined by 37 million.  The number continued to drop in subsequent years. It was 12.6 million during 2011-15. This slow downhappened mainly because there are not enough jobs outside agriculture. In the earlier period the workforce increased by 52 million, and absorbed both new entrants and people leaving agriculture. In the latter period the work force increased only by 14 million. Slowly but steadily the Kuznets process is on, but it is also causing much misery.

The report underlines four important facts about industrial employment. The share of manufacturing workforce has remained between 10-13 percent in the past twenty-five years. It is low compared to other developing countries with similar per capita income. Capital intensity is increasing in all industries. Labour productivity is increasing, but real wages are increasing at a much slower rate, which means that the share of wages in the total output is declining. The fourth fact is that the proportion of contract workers is increasing, mainly on account of declining proportion of permanent employees in large enterprises.

Consistent with the fourth fact is another recent trend. There is a rapid rise in the share of employment in the organised manufacturing sector, i.e., factories employing more than ten workers. This share was around 18 percent in 2011, but shot up to 27.5 percent by 2015. One possible reason the report notes for this is that after the relaxation of labour laws during the 1990s and after, larger firms have reduced subcontracting to smaller firms in the unorganised sector, and are doing in-house manufacturing with contract workers. This means that the conventional operation of Lewis process is under much strain. As the report says,‘The understanding that structural change would mean larger enterprises, and larger enterprises would mean more formal and regulated employment has been challenged on both fronts: first, because of a dispersal of production from larger to smaller units, and second, because of the creation of an informal workforce subject to fewer regulations, within the organised sector.’

A long standing debate in India is about the effect of labour laws on the size of industrial firmsand the adoption of technology. It is argued that the existing labour laws which put some constraints on the hiring and firing of workers encourage firms to remain below the threshold of ten workers, and to use high technology to avoid hiring additional workers. Hence, it is argued that these laws are harmful, both from the point of view of economic efficiency and creation of industrial sector jobs. The effect is seen in the problem of small number of medium size firms, compared to both the smaller unorganised sector units, and large enterprises – the problem of ‘missing firms’.Thisargument which is very common among management consultants, journalists and even in academia is convincingly disproved by SWI. They cite studies which show rampant underreporting of number of workers employed by firms. As per Economic Census in 1981 ‘52 percent of factories employing 10 or more workers that legally came under the purview of the Factories Act were not registered under the Act... The ratio went up to 57 percent in 1991, and to 66 percent in 2013’. So the problem of ‘missing’ midsize firms is a bogus problem, created by weak implementation of labour laws. SWI correctly terms the labour law debate as ‘Missing Firms or Missing Workers?’

The next two chapters of the report deal with the quality of work on offer, titled ‘How Good is the Work?’, and economic discrimination on the basis of gender and caste, titled ‘Who does the Work?’Paucity of space does not permit detailed discussion on a number of interesting data and conclusions in these chapters. The two noteworthy features of the quality of work in India are a very low ratio of formal employment (only 16 percent of wage workers have any written contract), and the recent trend of large scale hiring of contract workers by large enterprises. The economic discrimination against women and non-savarna castes shows in lower wages and segregation. For the same employment type women earn 50-80 percent less than men. A close correlation persists between a worker’s caste and remuneration. A dalit is nearly three times more likely than a member of the ‘others’ (including both non-OBC Shudra castes and Savarna castes) to be in low-paying elementary occupations, and nearly four time less likely to be in high paying professional jobs.

SWI focuses mainly on the economic aspects of work in India. However, there are many other aspects which depend on social and state practices and are directly related to politics, including class politics. For example, the question of industrial accidents is urgent, not only in informal enterprises, as shown in the flooding of a mine in Meghalaya, but also in large enterprises which employ large number of contract workers. The widespread violation of labour laws, including laws on minimum wages, trade union activity, and against bonded labour and child labour is another phenomenon little discussed in literature. One hopes that the Center of Sustainable Employment will continue the good work initiated with SWI 2018, and would take some of the other issues related to work in future reports.

Firing Salvos of Capitalist Class Interest from the Shoulders of New Technologies
TheChanging Nature of Work is ‘a World Bank Group Flagship Report’ for the year 2019. On its front cover it has the painting ‘Making of a Fresco’ by Diego Rivera, the famous Mexican mural artist, well known for his Marxist leanings, who was also a member of the Mexican Communist Party. This is ironic. The report could have gained from discussions and debates on new technologies among diverse Marxist currents, but avoids them completely.

The report has seven chapters and an overview. The foreword by World Bank president Jim Yong Kim, sets the orientation, tone and important assumptions and ideological blind-spots of the report. About the current state of humanity, it claims rather blandly that ‘(w)e are riding a new wave of uncertainty as the pace of innovation continues to accelerate and technology affects every part of our lives ‘. For working people, the uncertainty is linked to the nature of jobs in the future. ‘Many children currently in primary school will work in jobs as adults that do not even exist today’. Such new jobs ‘will require specific skills – a combination of technological know-how, problem solving, and critical thinking as well as soft skills such as perseverance, collaboration and empathy’. All these are declared to be essential parts of ‘human capital’ on the basis of which working people of the future can participate in the emerging economy to share in its prosperity. It urges developing countries ‘to invest’ in their people; in education and health, which are building blocks of ‘human capital’. The report unveils the Bank’s Human Capital Index, which ‘measures the consequences of neglecting investments in human capital in terms of the lost productivity of the next generation of workers’. It asks for rethinking ‘the social contract’, which means finding ‘new ways to invest in people and to protect them regardless of their employment status’. 

All this presents a practical concern for the future of working people. However, this is only how the future of technological change and work appears if looked through the glasses of capitalism and its managers. The cat comes out of the bag with the statement, to protect people ‘regardless of their employment status.’ Elsewhere in his foreword Mr Kim states that ‘(t)he days of staying in one job, or with one company …. are waning. In the gig economy, workers will likely have many gigs over the course of their careers’. It is interesting that this reference to the gig economy comes right after the claim that new jobs would require ‘problem solving skills, critical thinking’, etc., mentioned earlier. The largest number of gig workers worldwide are with e-commerce platforms like Amazon, or taxi service providers like Uber. Employees of these sectors have been protesting against harsh working conditions. The city of London recently demanded that Uber treat its drivers as its employees, which among other things implies that they receive at least minimum wage. In what sense home delivery ‘boys’ and overworked taxi drivers require higher cognitive skills is debatable. From the point of view of capital they are ideal workers, because they fit perfectly into the commodity character of labour, to be bought, used and discarded as and when needed, without any encumbrance. In labour studies such jobs are termed precarious employment. Not surprisingly, this term is of little use to World Bank specialists.

The first two chapters of the report deal with the seemingly objective processes of the changing nature of work and firms. The remaining five chapters deal with social policy under headings like ‘Building Human Capital’, ‘Lifelong Learning’, or ‘Ideas for Social Inclusion’. The report acknowledges that some of the data it uses in earlier chapters is inconclusive. For example, a graph on the percentage of jobs at risk from automation from a study done at Oxford University shows wide variations for all countries mentioned, from 6 to 56 percent for Japan, for example. One is left wondering about the purpose of such studies. On the other hand, there are other concrete studies of the actual effect of new technologies on existing jobs. Devika Narayan (who incidentally has been a part of Critique collective) has done a detailed ethnographic study of the IT industry in Bangalore. Some of her conclusions appear in Box 3.3 of the report on the State of Working India discussed earlier. These are instructive for appreciating the direction of winds of change in high technology sectors. Regarding recent downsizing in the Indian IT sector she notes that it is not temporary but reflective of permanent structural shifts. The new work environment is stressful; 13-15 hour workdays are normal. Following the adoption of Artificial Intelligence (AI), cloud computing, and data analytics, new areas of jobs are emerging, both for niche software skills as well as for marketing. These, however, do not compensate for lost jobs. Further, an internal polarisation is emerging which also has a social component. Employees with specialised niche skills belong to elite institutions like the IITs. Graduates from Tier 2 and 3 engineering colleges with ‘generic’ skills are in low demand.

The WB report frames the effect of technology on jobs in terms of two related, but seemingly contradictory processes. Automation replaces labour in production. Many jobs in manufacturing are likely to be taken over by robots. AI is taking away jobs requiring cognitive labour of data processing and analysis, and managerial jobs requiring information access and control. Investment decisions, assessment of loan applications, disease diagnostics, etc., are increasingly being taken over by AI algorithms, requiring less humanpower. Even routine jobs like driving will be taken away by sophisticated sensors married to AI. Innovation, on the other hand, shows in development of new products and services which create new kinds of jobs. Trends from advanced economies, where this process can be assumed to have advanced the most, are towards polarisation of jobs – expansion of both high paying and low paying jobs, with contraction of middle level jobs. This fact though is not integrated into the report, and gets only a cursory mention. The predictions of the US Bureau of Labour for the growth of different kinds of jobs between 2014 to 2024 are revealing. Computer and mathematical occupations, with a median wage of 80,000 dollars are projected to grow at double the rate of other jobs, but the number of people employed will remain small – about 2.8 percent of the total people employed. Personal care and services occupations, with median wage of 21,000 dollars will also grow at the same rate, but will employ about 50 percent more people than in the computer occupations. Health Care Support jobs having median wage of 26,000 dollars will grow fastest, four times the rate of other jobs. Manufacturing jobs will shrink. Office and administrative support, sales, and food preparation and services, all with low median wages will be occupations with the largest number of jobs.

Occupational polaristion is one aspect of increasing economic inequality. A comprehensive report on economic inequality was released by World Inequality Lab in 2018. This report concludes that in all regions of the world inequality has increased in the past 35 years, though the rate of growth is not same in different regions. The World Bank report, on the other hand, makes selective use ofdata.On the basis of a narrow set of data from Russia is tries to argue  that inequality is actually a problem of perception, rather than a reality. This is a bogus claim.

Income distribution in any economy has a significant impact on the nature of jobs. In a country with large inequality a significant proportion of jobs are constituted by personal services for the well-off. Whereas more jobs for public provision of goods and services tend to be the norm in countries with low inequalities. However, like precarity the effect of inequality on the nature of jobs is also foreign to the concerns of this report.

The second chapter of the report is on the changing nature of firms. New digital technologies permit new and faster avenues for market interaction. Ikea sources its products through a digitally connected global marketplace. Digital e-commerce platforms provide direct access to consumers at their home. Firms find it easy to scale up in this atmosphere. The report also notes the tendency towards monopolisation, so that only a few start-ups in a sector survive. Tax avoidance by global corporates is also discussed. The location of value addition in global supply chains is not easy to identify. Corporates use this loophole to declare their profits in tax havens. One aspect missed by the report is that digital firms like Uber, dealing in the free flow of data are actually champions of avoiding not only tax regulations, but any regulation at all. Clearly, from the point of view of quality of jobs, absence of any regulation should be of prime concern. The report is silent on this issue.

The ratio of wages to output has declined everywhere in the past three years. That is, people who work are getting less and less of what gets produced. This is a result of the neo-liberal offensive. In this environment, new digital technologies are giving capital even more pervasive and deeper control over production processes, market dynamics, and surveillance power through data capture and analysis.  This is turning new technologies into a powerful weapon of class domination.  Hence, new technologies need to be seen not only in technical, but also in their socio-political contexts. Capitalism extracts work through the threat of unemployment. Long working hours for one set of workers, and forced unemployment for the other, are the mechanisms of this threat. On the other hand it is perfectly consistent with new technologies that all workers equally and collectively share the burden of necessary work. This will reduce the number of working hours, as well as remove the threat of unemployment. Needless to say, this is possible only if workers gain the upper hand.

Given the myriad blind spots of the report which are a consequence of its inherently pro-capital bias, the social policy advocated for dealing with possible disruption of employment scenario is not surprising. Its main logic is: Please do not encumber employers with minimum wage, employer-provided health care, or protection against dismissal. Employers as such are going for automation due to high labour costs (a claim which is hilarious in the context of developing countries),and digital platforms are difficult to regulate anyway. The cost of labour market distortion due to regulation of employment is too high when automation is readily available. Given the latest developments in information technology it is much better to move towards direct social welfare support to overcome potential social unrest. Governments should additionally invest in early education and health. Once workers are skilled, they will be able to fend for themselves anyway in the job market. So, this is the panacea of market solution this report ends up with!

Ideologues of the World Bank are trained and get paid to paint a non-conflictual picture of even a distressed capitalism. This is an image of the ‘freedom and democracy’ of marketplace where everyone, capitalists and corporates having control over humongous means of production, and workers with their parcels of ‘human capital’, enter freely in commodity exchange. In reality, capitalism is a battle zone in which workers lose every day. The marketplace is not a harmonious venue of equality. There can be no equality between super-rich capitalists jostling around for even more profits, and workers forced to sell their ability to work because that is the only way they can survive. Rather than being content with remaining separateand alienated owners of their ‘human capital’ in competition with other such owners, workers regain their humanity by collective actions and constituting themselves as a class. This makes their everyday struggles directly political. Through strikes and other forms of collective action they force the state to regulate capital and implement policies to protect them from the most vicious attacks by capital. The future of jobs will be determined largely by the character of class struggles working people are able to wage in the coming decades.

Sanjay Kumar teaches Physics at St Stephen’s College, University of Delhi.

  
(This commentary was first published in Critique, Vol 6, Issue 1, 2019)



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